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CORRESPONDENCE
Commerce Clause Restraints on State Taxation:
Purposeful Economic Protectionism and Beyond
Walter Hellerstein *

Few questions in recent years have spawned as much controversy
and as little academic interest as the scope of commerce clause restraints on state tax power. The Supreme Court has handed down an
extraordinary number of significant decisions addressed to the limitations the commerce clause imposes on state taxation. I Yet these decisions have barely caught the eye of the nation's leading law reviews2 or
constitutional scholars. 3 Even those observers who have recognized
the Court's renaissance of interest in the dormant commerce clause
have largely confined their attention to state regulation, as distinguished from state taxation, of interstate commerce.4 If there is an

* Professor of Law, University of Georgia. A.B. 1967, Harvard University; J.D. 1970, University of Chicago. - Ed.
I. Over the past decade, the Court has averaged better than a decision a year addressed in
whole or in part to commerce clause restraints on state taxation. See Wardair Canada, Inc. v.
Florida Dept. of Revenue, 106-S. Ct. 2369 (1986); Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263
(1984); Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638 (1984); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 466
U.S. 388 (1984); Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983); Com·
monwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725
(1981); Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207 (1980); Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980); Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441
U.S. 434 (1979); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978); Department of Revenue v.
Association of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734 (1978); United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Commn., 434 U.S. 452 (1978); Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274
(1977); National Geographic Socy. v. California Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551 (1977); Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Commn., 429 U.S. 318 (1977). The Court will have rendered two
more such decisions by the time these comments see the light of day. Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington Dept. of Revenue, 107 S. Ct. 2810 (1987); American Trucking Assns. v. Scheiner, 107 S.
Ct. 2829 (1987).
2. Other than a few case notes in the Harvard Law Review's annual survey of Supreme Court
opinions, and my own efforts to explicate the Court's commerce clause decisions, see, e.g., Heller·
stein, State Income Taxation of Multijurisdictional Corporations: Reflections on Mobil, Exxon,
and H.R. 5076, 79 MICH. L. REv. 113, 130-39, 151-53 (1980); Hellerstein, State Taxation and
the Supreme Court: Toward a More Unified Approach to Constitutional Adjudication?, 75 MICH.
L. REv. 1426, 1441-46 (1977), one will search in vain in the leading law reviews for sustained
discussions of the Court's dormant commerce clause opinions addressed to state taxation.
3. One happy exception is Lockhart, A Revolution in State Taxation of Commerce?, 65
MINN. L. REV. 1025 (1981).
4. See Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 426 n.2
(1982); Maltz, How Much Regulation is Too Much - An Examination of Commerce Clause
Jurisprudence, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 47, 49 n.8 (1981); Smith, State Discriminations Against
Interstate Commerce, 74 CALIF. L. REv. 1203 (1986); Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Com758
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explanation for this puzzling neglect of state taxation, it may lie in the
remark of Gerald Gunther - who unceremoniously dropped the subject from his casebook - that "pursuit of the intricacies of state taxation . . . would require more time and space than the undertaking
warrants."5
Given the current turn in academic fashion, Donald Regan's characteristically thoughtful examination of the Court's commerce clause
jurisprudence in The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making
Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause 6 assumes an added dimension
because it discusses matters involving state taxation of interstate commerce. Although state taxation is not the principal focus of Regan's
analysis, his thoughts concerning the Court's state tax decisions raise
questions that merit further comment for two reasons: first, they shed
additional light on Regan's central thesis; second, they are worthy of
consideration in their own right.
I

Donald Regan's central thesis is that the Supreme Court should be
and has been exclusively concerned with purposeful economic protectionism in adjudicating commerce clause challenges to state regulation
of interstate commerce involving movement of goods. In nearly two
hundred pages of elaborately reasoned (if somewhat breezily articulated) argument, Regan seeks to demonstrate that judicial invalidation
of state legislation in these cases is theoretically justified only when the
legislation was adopted for the purpose of improving the competitive
position of in-state economic actors over their out-of-state competitors; that the Court's decisions are consistent with this theory; and
that talk of "balancing" in the Court's opinions, which conventional
wisdom takes seriously, amounts to little more than rhetorical window
dressing.
Regan acknowledges that some of the Court's commerce clause
decisions do not fit into this mold. In particular, he points to state
regulation of interstate transportation and state taxation of interstate
commerce as "areas in which the Court appears to do more under the
dormant commerce clause than merely suppress state protectionism."7
With regard to state taxation, Regan observes that neither the Court's
merce Clause, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 125. But see Sedler, The Negative Commerce Clause as a
Restriction on State Regulation and Taxation: An Analysis in Terms of Constitutional Structure,
31 WAYNE L. REV. 885 (1985).
5. G. GUNTHER, CONSfITUTIONAL LAW 332-33 (11th ed. 1985).
6. 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091 (1986).
7. Id. at 1182.
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insistence under the commerce clause that taxes be fairly apportioned 8
nor its disapproval of flat-rate taxes 9 can be explained on the basis of
the anti-protectionism principle. These cases reflect an additional
principle that businesses operating in more than one state should not
be subjected to heavier tax burdens than businesses operating in a single state ''just because they operate in more than one state." 10
The Court's decisions in the state tax field, no less than its decisions in other areas of commerce clause adjudication, reveal a vigilant
concern with purposeful economic protectionism. 11 But these decisions, as Regan recognizes, have plainly gone further:
The vice characteristic of those [taxes] which have been held invalid is
that they have placed on the commerce burdens of such a nature as to be
capable, in point of substance, of being imposed or added to with equal
right by every state which the commerce touches, merely because interstate commerce is being done, so that without the protection of the commerce clause it would bear cumulative burdens not imposed on local
commerce. 12

More recently, the Court has framed this requirement as one of" 'internal consistency - that is the [tax] must be such that, if applied by
every jurisdiction,' there would be no impermissible interference with
free trade." 13
Although Regan makes no pretense of comprehensively analyzing
the Court's state tax decisions, his treatment of them raises the question whether the two concerns he has identified - purposeful economic protectionism and cumulative tax burdens - can explain their
results. The Court's decisions over the past decade invalidating state
taxes on commerce clause grounds 14 suggest an affirmative answer. In
Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 15 the Court struck down a tax exemption for locally produced alcoholic beverages where the legislature's
avowed purpose was to favor local over out-of-state goods. 16 In West8. See, e.g., Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Missouri State Tax Commn., 390 U.S. 317 (1968).
9. See, e.g., Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946).
10. Regan, supra note 6, at 1186.
11. See, e.g., Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984); Westinghouse Elec. Corp.
v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388 (1984); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981); Boston Stock Exch. v.
State Tax Commn., 429 U.S. 318 (1977).
12. Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 255-56 (1938) (citations
omitted).
13. Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644 (1984) (quoting Container Corp. of America
v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169 (1983)) (bracketed word in original).
14. See cases cited in note 11 supra. The only other decision invalidating a levy on commerce
clause grounds during the past decade was Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S.
434 (1979), a decision that turned on considerations peculiar to state taxation of foreign commerce, with which Regan is not concerned. See Regan, supra note 6, at 1177 n.156.
15. 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
16. The Court did observe, however, that "[a] finding that state legislation constitutes 'eco-
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inghouse Electric Corp. v. Tully, 17 the Court struck down an income
tax credit explicitly designed by the legislature to favor in-state over
out-of-state activity. In Maryland v. Louisiana, 18 the Court struck
down a taxing scheme that was deliberately designed to shield local
economic activity from the impact of the exaction. In Boston Stock
Exchange v. State Tax Commission, 19 the Court struck down a levy
specifically intended to improve the competitive position of local vis-avis out-of-state stock exchanges. In Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 20 the
Court struck down a tax that subjected interstate business to the risk
of cumulative tax burdens not borne by local commerce. 21
The Court's decisions over the past decade sustaining state taxes
over commerce clause objections22 likewise support the hypothesis
that the Court views its essential responsibility as safeguarding taxpayers from purposeful economic protectionism and cumulative tax burdens. These decisions, however, do raise questions regarding the
precise nature of its commitment to those goals. For example, the
Court (like Regan) found no purposeful discrimination in Commonnomic protectionism' may be made on the basis of either discriminatory purpose or discriminatory effect." 468 U.S. at 270 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
17. 466 U.S. 388 (1984).
18. 451 U.S. 725 (1981).
19. 429 U.S. 318 (1977).
20. 467 U.S. 638 (1984).
21. Although Armco involved a tax that the Court also characterized as discriminatory, 467
U.S. at 639, 644, it is questionable whether the discrimination was "purposeful economic protectionism," as Regan has employed that phrase. The allegedly discriminatory provision at issue in
Armco was part of West Virginia's broad-based Business and Occupation Tax, imposed on the
privilege of engaging in business in the state and measured by the gross receipts from the business. The levy embraced most business activity in the state, including manufacturing, selling,
contracting, banking, public utility and other services, and natural resource production. In general, if a taxpayer were engaged in two different business activities, it would pay a tax for the
privilege of engaging in each activity upon the specified measure and rate for that activity. There
was an exception to this general pattern, however, with respect to enterprises engaged in both
manufacturing and wholesaling in the state. Although such an enterprise would in principle be
subject to both the manufacturing and the wholesaling tax, the statute provided that any person
exercising the taxable privilege of manufacturing was not required to pay the tax otherwise imposed on those exercising the taxable privilege of wholesaling. The legislative purpose underlying this exemption was clearly to avoid duplicative taxation of taxpayers engaged in closely
related activities in the state. Nevertheless, it facially discriminated against the out-of-state manufacturer who made wholesale sales in West Virginia: such a manufacturer would pay a wholesaling tax to West Virginia from which the local manufacturer-wholesaler would be exempt
(because it had paid a manufacturing tax). Despite the fact that the facial discrimination did not
result in actual discrimination because the manufacturing tax paid by the local manufacturerwholesaler was greater than the wholesaling tax paid by the out-of-state manufacturer-wholesaler, the Court pointed out that if other states were to impose taxes similar to West Virginia's,
interstate manufacturer-wholesalers would suffer because they "will pay both a manufacturing
tax [to the state of manufacture] and a wholesale tax while sellers resident in West Virginia will
pay only the manufacturing tax." 467 U.S. at 644.
22. See cases cited in note 1 supra, other than the cases discussed in the preceding paragraph
and Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441U.S.434 (1979), discussed in note 14supra.
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wealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 23 where Montana imposed a thirty percent severance tax on coal, virtually all of which was shipped outside
the state. Because the state had moved to dismiss the taxpayers' complaint, it was assumed that the tax was exported along with the coal
and that the tax bore no quantitative relationship to the value of services provided by the state. Hence the fundamental issue was whether
the commerce clause imposed any limits on the level of a state tax
borne by out-of-state taxpayers. There was, to be sure, no discrimination, purposeful or otherwise, between local and out-of-state consumers. Yet it was alleged that Montana had deliberately selected coal
(remember the energy crisis?) "as the object of this extraordinary tax
. . . to export the practical effect vf the tax to consumers in other
states."24 One could thus argue, as I did some years ago, that
the State's effective selection of a class of out-of-state taxpayers to shoulder a tax burden grossly in excess of any costs imposed directly or indirectly by such taxpayers on the State places an unconstitutional burden
upon interstate commerce. For the Court has made it clear that facially
nondiscriminatory taxes which by their practical operation discriminate
against interstate commerce are vulnerable to attack on Commerce
Clause grounds. While the States need not fine-tune the exercise of their
taxing power to accord with a precise accounting of the costs imposed by
and benefits provided to the taxpayer, they should not be permitted to
single out the nonresident taxpayer to bear the brunt of a demonstrable
imbalance on this score, at least if it can be shown that other levies with
a less selective impact do not suffer from such an imbalance. 25

Regan accurately observes that I have more recently shown myself
to be "sympathetic ... [to] Montana's point of view" 26 - sympathy
acquired, no doubt, in the course of three years of litigating the case on
behalf of the State of Montana. 27 And he is right in intimating that I
believe that Commonwealth Edison was correctly decided. My view,
however, is based on the firm conviction that the Court is an institutionally incapable and politically inappropriate body for determining
the appropriate level of a tax. 28 I remain uncomfortable with the notion that shifting the burden of the costs of state government to out-of23. 453 U.S. 609 (1981).
24. Brief for Appellants at 8, Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981)
(No. 80-581).
25. Hellerstein, Constitutional Constraints on State and Local Taxation of Energy Resources,
31 NATL. TAX J. 245, 249 (1978) (footnotes omitted).
26. Regan, supra note 6, at 1171.
27. I have consistently disclosed this fact in writing about Commonwealth Edison, including
the article cited by Regan. See McGrath & Hellerstein, Reflections on Commonwealth Edison
Co. v. Montana, 43 MONT. L. REV. 165, 165 (1982).
28. See Hellerstein, Constitutional Limitations on State Tax Exportation, 1982 AM. BAR
FOUND. RES. J. 1, 54-59.
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staters can never be regarded as purposeful economic protectionism so
long as local economic actors are not favored over their out-of-state
competitors. Even accepting Regan's view that citizens "as beneficial
owners of the state's revenues ... do not compete with foreign consumers,"29 I am not yet willing to abandon the principle that requiring interstate commerce to pay more than its way discriminates
against interstate commerce at least when intrastate commerce generally is not so burdened, even if there is no judicial remedy for that
discrimination under the commerce clause.
Another troublesome case that arguably involves both purposeful
economic protectionism and cumulative tax burdens is Moorman
Manufacturing Co. v. Bair. 30 In Moorman, the Court sustained the
constitutionality of Iowa's single-factor sales formula for apportioning
corporate income. The taxpayer manufactured and sold animal feeds.
All of its products sold to Iowa customers were manufactured in Illinois. The taxpayer sought to demonstrate that Iowa's single-factor
formula for apportioning net income, when considered in conjunction
with Illinois' three-factor formula of property, payroll, and sales, subjected income derived from its Iowa sales to duplicative taxation in
violation of the commerce clause. 31
Although the taxpayer had failed to prove that it had in fact been
subjected to duplicative taxation, the Court proceeded to address the
commerce clause questions raised by the two conflicting formulas on
the assumption that they produced "some overlap"32 in the taxation of
the taxpayer's income. The taxpayer had contended that "to the extent this overlap is permitted, the corporation that does business in
more than one State shoulders a tax burden not shared by those operating entirely within a State." 33 The Court responded that "[t]he only
conceivable constitutional basis for invalidating the Iowa statute
would be that the Commerce Clause prohibits any overlap in the computation of taxable income by the States."34 But it noted that because
29. Regan, supra note 6, at 1244.
30. 437 U.S. 267 (1978). In the interest of full disclosure, it should be noted that I was of
counsel to the Iowa Manufacturers Association, et al., which submitted a brief amici curiae
supporting the state in Moorman. Needless to say, the views expressed here are entirely my own
and do not necessarily - indeed, almost certainly do not - reflect the views of the Iowa Manufacturers Association, et al.
31. The taxpayer also claimed that the formula resulted in extraterritorial taxation in violation of the due process clause, but the Court rejected this argument on the ground that the
taxpayer had failed to prove that income attributed to Iowa was in fact earned in Illinois. 437
U.S. at 271-75.
32. 437 U.S. at 277.
33. 437 U.S. at 277.
34. 437 U.S. at 278.
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the risk of such overlap may exist any time a multistate firm does business in states having different division-of-income rules, a constitutional
requirement of precisely apportioned income would have unacceptably
broad consequences because it would require the Court to prescribe
uniform rules of income attribution among the states. The Court concluded that "the legislative power granted to Congress by the Commerce Clause of the Constitution would amply justify the enactment of
legislation requiring all States to adhere to uniform rules for the division of income," 35 and that such policy decisions should be made by
the body to which they are constitutionally committed. In thus rejecting the taxpayer's invitation to forge the commerce clause into a
tool for constitutionalizing division-of-income problems, the Court
made it plain that, in this context, the cumulative-burden doctrine has
a more limited role to play than once might have been envisioned.
Regan has no difficulty with the Court's decision in Moorman, despite its tolerance of cumulative tax burdens on the interstate firm
''just because the firm is interstate": 36 "Nonuniformity in methods
that are perfectly fair considered individually can result in adventitious burdening of interstate commerce. But this the Court has quite
reasonably decided not to worry about. " 37 If Regan's premises are
sound, I would have little quarrel with his conclusion. But are those
premises sound? Even though the single-factor sales formula passes
the test of "internal consistency" - i.e., if every state employed it, the
interstate business would be taxed no more heavily than its intrastate
competitor - it flunks the test of fairness. As the Court pointed out
in General Motors Corp. v. District of Columbia, 38 in striking down the
District's single-factor sales formula on statutory grounds:
While the Court has refrained from attempting to define any single appropriate method of apportionment, it has sought to ensure that the
methods used display a modicum of reasonable relation to corporate activities within the State.... The standard three-factor formula can be
justified as a rough, practical approximation of the distribution of either
a corporation's sources of income or the social costs which it generates.
By contrast, the geographic distribution of a corporation's sales is, by
itself, of dubious significance in indicating the locus of either factor. 39

Furthermore, it is questionable whether the risk of cumulative burdens created by Iowa's single-factor sales formula was truly "adventitious." Even in 1965, the Court knew that
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

437 U.S. at 280.
Regan, supra note 6, at 1187.
Id. at 1186 n.180.
380 U.S. 553 (1965).
380 U.S. at 561.
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[t]he great majority of States imposing corporate income taxes apportion
the total income of a corporation by application of a three-factor formula
which gives equal weight to the geographical distribution of plant, payroll, and sales. The use of an apportionment formula based wholly on
the sales factor, in the context of general use of the three-factor approach, will ordinarily result in multiple taxation of corporate net income ....40

By 1978, forty-four out of the forty-five states other than Iowa that
imposed corporate income taxes employed the three-factor formula. 41
If the Court can consider other states' laws or practices in the commerce clause calculus for determining the validity of state regulations
of interstate transportation,42 which it apparently can do without objection from Regan, 43 why can it not do the same thing in the tax cases
to protect interstate taxpayers from bearing heavier tax burdens than
their intrastate competitors merely because the former engage in interstate commerce?44
Finally, even if one believes that the Court has no business invalidating apportionment formulas under the commerce clause on the basis of their relative fairness, and that commerce clause decisions (at
least in the tax field) should not turn on the current configuration of
other states' legislation, there remains the question whether Iowa's
statute amounted to purposeful economic protectionism. It is no secret that Iowa is a market state. Insofar as out-of-state businesses are
engaged in economic activity in Iowa it is likely to be through sales to
Iowa customers. Moreover, insofar as local businesses are engaged in
economic activity outside Iowa it is likely to be through sales to outof-state customers. Hence Iowa's adoption of a single-factor sales
formula in the context of the general use of a three-factor formula by
other states imposes a lower total income tax burden on Iowa-based
businesses doing business in other states than on similarly situated outof-state businesses doing business in Iowa. 45 The effect is to improve
the economic position of the Iowa-based business over its foreign competitor by minimizing the state tax burden of the former and maximizing the state tax burden of the latter. It takes no great feat of
imagination to conjure up the legislative purpose underlying the Iowa
statute, and it is a purpose that comes awfully close to Regan's defini40. 380 U.S. at 559 (footnote omitted).
41. Moorman, 437 U.S. at 283 (Powell, J., dissenting).
42. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945); Bibb v. Navajo
Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
43. See Regan, supra note 6, at 1182-85.
44. See Moorman, 437 U.S. at 293-97 (Powell, J., dissenting).
45. Moorman, 437 U.S. at 283-85 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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tion of purposeful economic protectionism. And while I am not proposing that we resolve these cases on the basis of guilt by association,
it is not without relevance that the Iowa Manufacturers Association
filed an amicus brief supporting the validity of Iowa's single-factor
sales formula. 46
II

In the course of sketching the broad outlines of his dormant commerce clause theory, with its admittedly "brief" and "oversimplified"47 treatment of the taxation area, Regan nevertheless makes
several specific observations about the tax cases that warrant similarly
specific comments:
(1) Regan suggests that the "national interest in not subjecting
interstate commerce to special disadvantage just because of its interstate character ... may account for the rule of Freeman v. Hewit that
an interstate sale may not be taxed by the state of the seller."48 The
"rule" of Freeman v. Hewit 49 as articulated by the Court was that a
"direct" tax on the proceeds from interstate sales violated the commerce clause wholly apart from any question of discrimination or cumulative tax burdens. 50 That rule of absolute immunity of interstate
commerce from state taxation was explicitly repudiated by the Court
in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady. 51 To be sure, one may recast
the "rule" as an effort by the Court to prevent cumulative taxation in
light of the presumed power of the state of the buyer to impose a tax
on the interstate sale. 52 Nevertheless, it remains unclear under the
Court's contemporary commerce clause doctrine whether the Court
would require the state of origin or the state of destination to yield,
assuming both had nexus with the sale and each sought to tax it. 53 It
would seem that the Court would not permit both states to tax the
transaction on an unapportioned basis, yet the Court "has expressly
reserved the question whether a State must credit a sales tax paid to
46.
47.
48.
49.
SO.
51.
52.

See note 30 supra.
Regan, supra note 6, at 1185.
Id. at 1187-88 (footnote omitted).

329 U.S. 249 (1946).
329 U.S. at 254-57.
430 U.S. 274 (1977).
Regan, supra note 6, at 1188; see also Hellerstein, State Taxation of Interstate Business
and the Supreme Court, 1974 Term: Standard Pressed Steel and Colonial Pipeline, 62 VA. L.
REV. 149, 172 (1976).
53. The most perceptive judicial discussions of this problem appear in the separate opinions
of Justice Rutledge in Freeman, 329 U.S. at 259-83 (concurring), and in International Harvester
Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340, 349-62 (1944) (concurring and dissenting),
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another State against its use tax."54
(2) Regan recognizes that a compensating use tax could be part
of a protectionist scheme "if, for example, a state that made furniture
mainly out of oak imposed a sales tax and a compensating use tax only
on furniture made out of maple." 55 He goes on to note that "[h]ere, as
elsewhere, purpose is the crucial question." 56 Purpose is not, however,
the only question raised by such a case. In Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 51 the Court examined the application of Louisiana's use tax to specialized equipment purchased and assembled
outside the state for use in the state. The focus of the controversy was
the appropriate measure of the use tax as applied to a taxpayer who
purchased and assembled equipment outside the state. The statute defined the measure of the tax as the full value of equipment purchased
outside the state, including the value of the taxpayer's labor and overhead attributable to its out-of-state assembly. Had the taxpayer
purchased and assembled this equipment in Louisiana, it would have
been subject to a sales tax measured only by the cost of the articles
purchased, without inclusion of the labor costs or overhead.
It is difficult to believe that the discrimination against out-of-state
assemblers of equipment was purposeful. In Louisiana, as elsewhere,
the sales tax base has generally been limited to sales of tangible personal property. Unless the sales tax statute specifically so provides,
sales of services have not been taxable. The use tax base is generally
defined in terms of the "cost price" of the item used in the state, which
ordinarily would be equivalent to the sales price of the item if sold at
retail in the taxing state. In cases in which a final product is
purchased at retail, these definitions will give rise to no inequality between in-state and out-of-state purchases, because the tax bases will be
identical. Hence, in all but a handful of cases, Louisiana's taxing
scheme would work without constitutional hitch because the out-ofstate purchaser would be saddled with a use tax in Louisiana on the
out-of-state purchase identical to the sales tax he would have paid in
Louisiana had he purchased the item there. The problem in Halliburton was that the scheme did not work for the peculiar case of the outof-state self-assembler of property brought into Louisiana. The Court
quite properly struck down the tax because it discriminated against
the out-of-state purchaser-assembler as compared with its in-state
counterpart. Purpose, however, was irrelevant. Indeed, the Court de54.
55.
56.
57.

Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14, 21-22 (1985).
Regan, supra note 6, at 1256.

Id.
373 U.S. 64 (1963).
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clared that "[w]hile the inequality in question may have been an accident of statutory drafting, it does in fact strike at a significant segment
of economic activity and carries economic effects of a type proscribed
by many previous cases." 58
Halliburton is nevertheless quite consistent with Regan's broad
commerce clause theory. The case can easily be explained as one that
placed the interstate business at a competitive disadvantage merely because it was interstate.
(3) Regan poses the question whether, in the absence of a local
sales tax, a state could "adopt a use tax applicable only to imported
goods and ... defend the use tax on the ground that local retailers pay
higher property taxes than foreign retailers, or that foreign retailers
pay lower payroll taxes than their local counterparts."59 Regan's answer is negative, and he suspects that the Court's would be also,
although he acknowledges that "[t]he Court's view on 'equalizing'
taxes may be more generous than mine."60 In fact, the Court has
struggled for years with "complementary" or "compensatory" taxes
that are offered by the states as a defense to taxes that appear to discriminate against interstate commerce. 6 I Recently the Court has
taken a narrow view of the complementary tax doctrine, 62 suggesting
that Regan's negative answer would be shared by the Court. Nevertheless, in light of the Court's precedents sustaining as "complementary" taxes whose relationship to one another has been unsettlingly
loose, 63 the precise contours of the doctrine remain uncertain.
(4) I should finally address the case where my differences with
Regan seem greatest. Regan takes me to task for suggesting that the
decision in Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 64 which sustained the constitutionality of a compensating use tax scheme, countenanced a form of
protectionism by interfering with interstate tax competition. 65 In the
article that Regan cites, 66 I had relied in turn on Professor Ernest
Brown, who had inquired:
58. 373 U.S. at 72.
59. Regan, supra note 6, at 1257.
60. Id.
61. See generally Hellerstein, Complementary Taxes as a Defense to Unconstitutional State
Tax Discrimination, 39 TAX LAW. 405 (1986).
62. See Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 642-43 (1984); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451
U.S. 725, 758-60 (1981).
63. Alaska v. Arctic Maid, 366 U.S. 199, 204-05 (1961); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v.
Virginia, 358 U.S. 434 (1958).
64. 300 U.S. 577 (1937).
65. Regan, supra note 6, at 1252-55.
66. Hellerstein, Federal Limitations on State Taxation ofInterstate Commerce, in 2 COURTS
AND FREE MARKETS: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 431, 461-62 (T.
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Should one state in a federal system be able to raise its price levels, isolate itself and protect its markets from the outside price competition
thereby stimulated? Or does the federal system demand at least that degree of economic unity which would require that consumers and buyers
within the state have some measure of access to a free market outside? 67

To Regan's charge that my views were ill-conceived, I can only
plead nolo contendere, a plea I had actually entered in print, although
admittedly without formally recanting my earlier views:
Insofar as a use tax simply assures that a tax is paid on all consumption,
whether from in-state or out-of-state producers, such a tax is not "protective" as that term is generally understood. A protective tariff is traditionally viewed as a levy that singles out the foreign product for taxation
to which the local good is not subjected in order to protect the local good
from foreign competition.... [R]aising domestic price levels is not generally regarded as protectionism. Moreover, Professor Brown's assumption that a state with a broad-based consumption tax can isolate itself
and protect its market from outside competition is ill-founded because
in-state producers are given no artificial tax advantage by a use tax that
merely mirrors a sales tax, and higher in-state prices will discourage instate purchases by residents of other states. . . . Professor Brown's concerns are rooted in the notion that the federal system gives consumers in
states with consumption taxes the right to escape such taxes by purchasing goods in states without consumption taxes. Although this might correspond to Professor Brown's view of "access to a free market," it is at
odds with the Court's modern commerce clause opinions that have repudiated the idea that the commerce clause creates a tax free zone of immunity for interstate commerce. 6 8
Sandalow & E. Stein eds. 1982). Regan also cites my comments in the symposium discussion in
REGULATION, FEDERALISM, AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE 125 (A. Tarlock ed. 1981).
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